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the establishment of Anti-Communist League 
of Turkey (TKMD). During the Cold War era, 
Anti-Communist League (KMD) was one of 
the prominent projects designed for Turkey. 
KMD became active in  1950 in Zonguldak and 
opened its first official branch in Istanbul in 
1956. However, the association was not to be 
long-lived, and was closed down after the 1960 
military coup. In 1963, it was reestablished 
under the name TKMD and came to be asso-
ciated with CIA-supported counterinsurgency 
operations. After the association was eventually 
closed down, some members of TKMD played 
a role in the establishment of Nationalist Action 
Party (MHP) and Society for Dissemination of 
Science (İlim Yayma Cemiyeti). 
Various biographies of Gülen suggest that 
in this period, despite being a co-founder of 
TKMD he also attended meetings at People’s 
Houses (Halkevleri), probably to compensate 
for the negative historical image associated with 
the former. 
In following years, Gülen worked as preacher 
(vaiz) at mosques in Thrace and the Aegean Re-
gion, in particular, Edirne, Kırklareli and İzmir. 
Stately aspirations inside the state
Subsequently Gülen rose to notoriety because 
of two political lawsuits. In the first lawsuit, he 
was placed under custody in the aftermath of 
the March 12 military coup on May 5, 1971 for 
violating the Article 163 of the Turkish Criminal 
Code, which could be summarized as “conspi-
ring to establish a religion-based state.” After 
seven months of imprisonment, he was finally 
released in 1974. Meanwhile, he continued to 
give sermons in Edremit, Manisa and Bornova. 
Gülen can be said to have shot to fame after 
imprisonment and acquittal. In 1975 and 1976, 
A religious sect now defies the strongest political 
party in Turkey. There must be a reason for this 
alarming self-confidence. Is it rooted in history; that 
is, does the sect have a long heritage? Not really -it is 
a movement that started to take shape in the 1970s. 
What about economic clout? Well, sort of; but in a 
country where each transaction must be approved by 
the state, economic force can translate into business 
investment only as far as the state allows it. 
As such, it is hard to talk about huge business 
power in this respect. International connecti-
ons? The Gülen sect is being investigated by the 
FBI, branded as “suspicious” by Germany and 
its schools are banned in Russia, Uzbekistan, 
Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan; it is now 
trying to gain clout in religious conflicts in de-
veloping countries such as Nigeria, Sudan and 
Somalia. This kind of international influence 
is not enough to challenge a ruling political 
party which has secured 50% of votes. Although 
Prime Minister Erdoğan suggests otherwise, 
Gülen’s followers cannot be likened to the As-
sassins of Hassan-i Sabbah, that is, an army of 
believers willing to die for their faith. Well, what 
is really at stake then? How have they come to 
secure so much political power?
A familiar starting point: Fighting 
communism and evolution 
The name of the association where Gülen chose 
to step into politics is rather telling, considering 
the conditions of the epoch. After completing 
his military service in 1963 in İskenderun, Gü-
len returned to Erzurum and participated in 
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Gülen travelled across Anatolia, preaching 
against communism and Darwinism. He started 
to publish the periodical Sızıntı in 1979, which 
took up similar themes. 
Gülen got into trouble with the state once 
again during the 1980 military coup. A search 
warrant was issued against him, obliging him 
to hide. The Prime Minister Turgut Özal at the 
time had the warrant cancelled a few years later. 
Mehmet Keçeciler, who then was their go-
between, recalls that period in a long biographi-
cal interview, published by Hayy Kitap:
“Fethullah Gülen vanished into thin air just 
before the military coup. Following the 1983 
elections, we came to power. I was the head of 
ANAP’s [Motherland Party] party organization 
back then. There was a search warrant for Fet-
hullah Hodja. The late Burdur Governor İsmail 
Günindi was an old friend of mine from when 
we were working as state employees…. One day 
Günindi came to the ANAP Headquarters to 
say thank you. Alaattin Kaya and Mevlüt Saygın 
were also in my office. Kaya was the publisher 
of Zaman newspaper, and Saygun the manager 
of Fethullah Hodja’s education institutions. I 
introduced my visitors to one other. İsmail said 
‘Fethullah Gülen Hodja is in hiding for no good 
reason. The prosecutor of Burdur only wants to 
take his statement; then they will let him go. The 
sect is causing unnecessary trouble by urging 
Fethullah Gülen to flee.’ Naturally, Kaya and 
Saygun were all ears. İsmail said all this, and 
then left. A few days later, Kaya and Saygun paid 
me a visit; Kaya said that they had talked to the 
Hodja about the issue. He had said ‘I will turn 
myself in, if Turgut Özal gives his word; I will 
give a statement’. They said that they wanted to 
meet with the Prime Minister. I expressed their 
wish to Mr. Özal. I was a bit worried though. To 
make sure, I called İsmail (governor of Burdur) 
and said, ‘Talk with the prosecutor and double 
check. It would be very unpleasant if Fethullah 
Hodja turns himself in, only to be arrested. Our 
prestige is at stake here.’ İsmail then contacted 
the prosecutor and called me back: ‘No worries. 
They won’t arrest him; they will just take his 
statement and let him go.’… Once I made sure 
that he would not be arrested, we paid a visit to 
Mr. Özal together with Kaya and Saygun. Özal 
said to them, ‘I confirm what Mehmet has told 
you.’ A few days later, Fethullah Hodja did turn 
himself in in İzmir, gave a statement and was 
let go.”
From this anecdote, we can see that Gülen 
already enjoyed protection and privileges from 
the highest officials of the state back then. 
However, it is not so easy to grasp the reasons 
behind this influence. That is because, although 
Gülen seems to act like the heir of Said Nursi, a 
key figure in the Islamist movement in Turkey, 
his words and political activities are not repre-
sentative of Nursi’s line. Although he once had 
ties to the Okuyucular branch of the Nur sect, he 
went his own way after the sect was divided into 
two: Whereas the Yeni Asır circle voted no to the 
1982 Constitution, the Şuracılar branch voted 
yes. Gülen’s new line was harshly criticized by 
the followers of Said Nursi, although there was 
significant competition and strife amongst the 
latter. The criticism was mainly aimed at Gülen’s 
close ties with the state and private business. 
The opus of Said Nursi is still read and discussed 
in student houses, schools and conversation 
groups controlled by the Gülen sect. Different 
branches of the Nur sect, although in discord 
about almost every issue, do agree that Gülen 
is far from being an heir of Said Nursi’s political 
and religious thought. 
Gülen resigned from the civil service in 
1981, as there was a search warrant against him. 
He continued to write articles for magazines 
and gave unofficial sermons. Then in 1989, he 
became a voluntary preacher at Valide Sultan 
Mosque in Üsküdar. His first books comprise 
the sermons delivered in this mosque. By the 
1990s, Gülen was already a frequently cited po-
litical figure. Everyone talked about his schools, 
Gülen started his political 
career in Accociation For 
Fighting Communism, which 
was know for its counter-
guerrilla operations and was 
crucial to Nationalist Action 
Party's (MHP) foundation.
The Gülen movement was fully aware of class-based and 
cultural divides and made good use of these. The Gülen 
sect did not aspire to social harmony; they translated 
existing class and culture divides into intra-sect dynamics, 
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could not fully capitalize on, has turned out to 
be a critical advantage for the Gülen sect and 
for National Vision. Both movements can thus 
develop a religious teaching steering away from 
moralistic principles and practices, which could 
otherwise lead one to question certain political 
and economical activities: They offer Anatolian 
religious groups—historically excluded from the 
economic sphere and distribution networks—
an opportunity to thrive under current capitalist 
conditions. In a world where conventional, 
deep-rooted sects preach humility and mode-
ration, and try to preserve their autonomy by 
keeping the state at bay, this lack of historical 
roots allows the Gülen sect and National Visi-
on to uphold ambition and organization “for 
the sake of God”—the so-called “service”—to 
engage in conspicuous consumption on order 
to praise the force of faith, and to utilize the 
weapons of the enemy in the fight for survival. 
In other words, it allows them to disregard the 
discrepancy between the instrument and mes-
sage. In this respect, the competition between 
the Gülen sect and AKP—itself a transformed 
representative of the National Vision—is far 
from surprising. 
Another dynamic powering the rapid ascent 
of the Gülen sect in the 1990s is related to the 
the built-in inequalities of the socio-economic 
system. The Gülen movement was fully aware 
of class-based and cultural divides and made 
good use of these. The Gülen sect did not aspire 
to social harmony; they translated existing class 
and culture divides into intra-sect dynamics, 
and offered upward class mobility as a source 
of promise and motivation. If you studied hard, 
you could be accepted to a higher echelon. 
Otherwise you risked losing the advantages 
associated with your sect membership or rema-
ining stuck with no socio-economic mobility. As 
such, the organization resembled the manage-
ment of a large corporation, where awards and 
punishments are distributed to according to 
performance and social capital. 
And finally, the third dynamic was shaped 
in the area left vacant by the state. They helped 
each other when purchasing a car or house, or 
when setting up a business. Additionally, a vast 
network of businessmen also provided that key 
ingredient of well-oiled market mechanisms, 
that is, trust. Since they had trust in each other, 
they could sign long-term business contracts. 
In local chambers of commerce and industry, 
these business networks eventually led to po-
litical clout. The same was true for schools and 
student houses. After a person joined the sect as 
a very young university student, they no longer 
had to worry about choosing their job, their spo-
use or even the name of their child. The sect also 
Sect members could easily repay soaring foreign currency 
debts despite exchange rate hikes, thanks to internal 
solidarity. They helped each other when purchasing a car 
or house, or when setting up a business. Besides, a vast 
network of businessmen also provided that key ingredient 
of well-oiled market mechanisms, that is, trust. Since they 
had trust in each other, they could sign long-term business 
contracts. In local chambers of commerce and industry, 
these business networks eventually led to political clout. 
students, prep schools called “dershane”, com-
panies, and even attempts to place his followers 
in the army and police. In 1994, he established 
and became the honorary president of Foun-
dation of Journalists and Writers (Gazeteciler 
ve Yazarlar Vakfı), which became the flagship 
of the Gülen sect. The foundation became a 
prominent political player by organizing the 
Abant Meetings in the aftermath of the military 
memorandum of February 28, 1997. The ob-
jective of these meetings was to help Turkish 
political elites reach consensus, even if a basic 
one, on key issues. Indeed, the AKP project was 
based on such a basic consensus. The burea-
ucratic clout of the Gülen sect would thus be 
coupled with the political popularity of Tayyip 
Erdoğan and his entourage. Liberal intellectuals 
contributed to this alliance a legitimizing dis-
course with democratic references. Rocked by 
political turmoil, unsolved political murders, 
and cases of corruption in the 1990s, Turkey 
was in a pretty desperate position. It was almost 
inevitable for AKP—rivaled only by Cem Uzan’s 
Youth Party (Genç Parti)—to become the rising 
star of center right.
Gülen sect on the rise 
The main dynamics underlying the stellar rise 
of the Gülen sect are to be found in the transfor-
mations of religion, politics and state. Let’s start 
with the first one: 
Unlike the Süleymancılar sect, which rose to 
prominence in similar fashion, and the National 
Vision (Millî Görüş), which first appeared as a 
political project before turning into a sect, the 
Gülen sect does not have a historically rooted 
tradition. Although Gülen traces his philosophi-
cal roots back to Said Nursi and certain Islamists 
even claim his sect to be a modern branch of the 
Kadiri denomination, Gülen has long abando-
ned these political and philosophical referen-
ces. This lack of roots, which the Süleymancılar 
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became the social guarantor of business capital, 
which the state could not provide. As the state 
became less and less reliable, sects become 
more and more so. However, this has also chan-
ged in recent years. Having lost its flexibility, the 
Gülen sect—and others, too—started closing 
themselves to the outside world, and sharing 
their beliefs and “acquisitions” only inside their 
own circle. As such, sects stopped expanding by 
offering reassurance to more and more people, 
and instead started to give a bigger share of the 
rewards to current members. Thus, the social 
and economic relations established by the sect 
turned into a sphere of privilege. 
Transformation of capital as the 
scene of competition
The so-called Gülenist capital has come about 
by liberating itself of conventional Islam and its 
deep-rooted traditions. Although initially or-
ganized in the business organization MÜSİAD, 
Gülen-related businessmen soon differentiated 
themselves from other MÜSİAD members by 
business methods. In 2005, they set up TUS-
KON, which became a rival alternate that gran-
ted significant favors to its members. From 2007 
onwards, MÜSİAD members started asking 
AKP officials why the sect received preferential 
treatment. To understand this competition, 
one must examine what funds were allocated 
to which companies by the development and 
investment agencies set up under AKP rule, as 
well as the political connections of concerned 
companies. Nevertheless, it must also be noted 
that AKP’s animosity towards the sect has beco-
me more visible as MÜSİAD increased its clout. 
On the other hand, the feeble percentage 
of MÜSİAD and TUSKON members among 
Turkey’s largest corporations suggests that this 
competition takes place on a rather limited base 
and that this capital accumulation process has 
yet to find its own feet, independent of political 
support. 
According to 2010 data provided by the 
Istanbul Chamber of Industry, the number of 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON members among the 
500 largest members of the chamber does not 
even reach one hundred. The total share in 
employment of these two rival associations is 
around 10%. Their joint share in total profits is 
also around the same percentage. Considering 
that only 8 MÜSİAD members made it to the list 
in 1990, there obviously has been considerable 
progress. Judging by the table below, one could 
argue that Islamic capital does not have much 
weight among the top 500 members of Istanbul 
Chamber of Industry, and that it compensates 
for this disadvantage through political and bu-
reaucratic advantages offered by AKP. As such, 
the rivalry between TUSKON and MÜSİAD not 
only has a rather small stake, but also seems 
very risky. TUSKON has made significant he-
adway by exporting 2.5 times MÜSİAD’s export 
volume; however, this seems set to change due 
to the ongoing conflict between AKP and sect. 
ISO 500 MÜSİAD TUSKON
Number of 
companies 500 31 45
Ex-factory sales 
(TL billion) 210.6 7.6 12.4
Share in total 
(%) 100 3.6 5.9
Exports (USD 
million) 46.224 1.004 2.522
Share in total 
(%) 100 2.1 5.5
Profit (TL 
million) 15.555 671 986
Share in total 
(%) 100 4.3 6.3
Number of 
employees 516.305 19.981 33.469
Share in total 
(%) 1000 3.8 6.5
The first signs of tension between Gülen and 
AKP surfaced in 2007. The reason for conflict 
was same with that of their alliance in 2002. Er-
doğan and his entourage enjoyed huge political 
popularity; however, they lacked support in the 
bureaucracy, which found itself in a straitjacket 
after the February 28th memorandum. Accor-
ding to their initial agreement, the Gülen sect 
would support AKP with members who gradua-
ted from its schools and then took office across 
the world; which could also be seen as a privi-
lege granted to the sect by AKP. And it worked. 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s proud claim “We have 
eliminated bureaucratic red tape” actually poin-
ted to a change of guard in the bureaucracy. The 
bureaucracy was now put to the service of the 
party. According to this equation, the party was 
equivalent to the general public, as it enjoyed 
50% electoral support. 
It is not hard to guess that the alliance bet-
ween Erdoğan’s team and the Gülen sect ran 
into problems from the very beginning. Nevert-
heless, the problem first surfaced with the Mavi 
Marmara crisis. This ship, which allegedly trans-
ported aid to Gaza under the control of the NGO 
called İHH, was supported by Erdoğan, whereas 
Gülen indicated that Israel’s permission should 
be sought beforehand. With the subsequent 
killing of nine Turkish citizens on the ship by the 
Israeli army, this became a turning point in the 
relations between Gülen and AKP. 
The second crisis, which triggered conside-
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support of Gülenists in the judiciary and police 
to end the army’s control over the political are-
na. This was done by means of lawsuits dubbed 
Ergenekon and Balyoz. It must have been beco-
me clear to Erdoğan that the Gülenist seeds he 
himself had planted in the bureaucracy would 
cause him serious headaches in any conflict of 
interest. 
Finally, hell broke loose one year later, with 
the eruption of the dershane (university test 
preparation centers) scandal. The government 
wanted to close down the centers and increase 
the number of private schools (kolej) instead. 
However, the centers were the main channel 
of socialization for the Gülen sect. Even more 
importantly, the sect exploded with anger to see 
AKP, to which it had lent so much support in the 
bureaucracy, take a clear measure to eradicate 
its social base. Although the government finally 
passed legislation to postpone the closure of the 
test prep centers by two years, the looming crisis 
could not be avoided. 
What happened after the police crackdown 
on government corruption on December 17 are 
the scenes of a duel between the two modern 
streams of Turkish Islamism: the Gülen sect and 
the AKP. In one corner we have the Fethullah 
Gülen sect and their business concerns, which 
boast great support in the bureaucracy, judici-
ary and police; in the other, AKP with its huge 
clout in the legislative and executive branches. 
What is positive about all this is that the scandal 
has revealed the banality of Turkish Islamism, 
as it turns around such worldly issues as cor-
ruption and nepotism. As such, Gülen and AKP 
have jointly put an end to an epoch when the 
historical power of Islam as a religion could be 
translated into political legitimacy by Islamists. 
rable public uproar, was soon covered up as it 
risked damaging both parties. The scandal was 
related to claims of corruption in the agency 
regulating university and civil service entrance 
exams, the ÖSYM, and thus concerned millions 
of people. The government and sect made their 
utmost to limit the scandal surrounding this key 
institution. In 2010, the civil service entrance 
exam KPSS was cancelled after claims that the 
questions were leaked to Gülenist test prep 
centers (dershane). AKP seemed to confirm 
these claims as it tried—in vein—to bring the 
ÖSYM under direct government control. Simi-
lar accusations were made about other exams 
organized by the agency; however, due to the 
extremely sensitive nature of the issue, the scan-
dal was soon covered up, and the rivalry betwe-
en the two sides inside the bureaucracy did not 
fully surface. 
The third key moment in the tension betwe-
en the sect and AKP concerned Hakan Fidan, 
the head of the Turkish intelligence service 
MİT. The crisis broke out on February 7, 2012 
when the special prosecutor in charge of the 
KCK lawsuit, Sadrettin Sarıkaya, invited Fidan to 
give a statement about the case. Prime Minister 
Erdoğan clearly stated that Fidan would not do 
so. Immediately, a legislative change was pas-
sed to grant Fidan and his team legal immunity. 
In fact, this was the beginning of the nightmare 
for AKP, which had previously capitalized on the 
The sect also became the social guarantor of business 
capital, which the state could not provide. As the state 
became less and less reliable, sects become more and 
more so. However, this has also changed in recent years. 
Having lost its flexibility, the Gülen sect –and others, 
too– started closing themselves to the outside world, and 
sharing their beliefs and historical “acquisitions” only 
inside their own circle. 
Compared to MÜSİAD, which 
is relatively narrow in scale 
and geographical reach, 
TUSKON has a wider imperial 
vision. TUSKON companies 
are competing worldwide with 
global companies.
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